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JOACHIM BLATTER* & HELEN INGRAM"

States, Markets and Beyond:
Governance of Transboundary Water
Resources
ABSTRACT

This article focuses on a comparison of states and markets in the

management of transboundary water. Borders are often harbingers
of change and areas of innovation. Nation states have struggled
mightily to overcome problems of shared river basins and aquifers.
Today, the state-centric model is losing its hegemony. Once the
article has established the limitations of states as governing
institutions, its attention turns to an alternative offeredb public
choice scholars. Proposals for functional, overlapping, and
competing jurisdictions are subjected to criticalscrutiny andfound
wanting. Both of these concept ual frameworks have serious flaws.
While the state-centered model poorly captures the emerging
complexities of intermestic politics, the market approach fails to
incorporate institutions that foster intersectoral cooperation and
communication. The article concludes that effective governance of
fluid resources is increasingly and necessarily founded on the
cooperative interrelationships of various institutions that represent
the variety of complementing logics and functions within the
transnational water arena.
INTRODUCTION
Throughout most of modem history, the state has been central to
the development and allocation of water resources. Simply put, water has
been viewed as too socially important to be left to private actors. 1 However,
in the last two decades the notion that markets are far more effective and
efficient than governments in managing water resources has gained
momentum. Beginning as a policy idea espoused mainly by resource

economists and public choice scholars,2 privatization of water utilities
became common practice in the United States and the United Kingdom.

*European Centre for Comparative Government and Public Policy, Berlin, Grmany.
**Professor, Warmington Endowed Chair, Urban and Regional Planning,
Environmental Analysis & Design, Political Science, University of Califormiae Irvne.
1. See generally ARTHUR MAASs & RAYMOND L. ANDERSON, AND THE DESRT SHALL
REJOIcE: CONFLICT, GROWTH, AND JUSTICE INARID ENVIRONMNT (1978); HELEN INGRAM,
WATER POLITncs: CoNT

ur AND CHANGE (1990); JOHN WALTON, WESTERN TIMES AND

WATER WARS: STATE, CULTURE, AND REBELLUON IN CALIFtORNIA (1992).
2. See TERRY L. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POuIcY DROUGHT xii (1983).
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Then, through the influence of such institutions as the World Bank-staffed
heavily by resource economists imbued with the latest thinking-markets
gained acceptance as water management institutions in many parts of the
third world, particularly Latin America. Most recently, the commodity or
market view of water has reached the international stage, and in March
1998 the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development urged
that the outmoded concept of water as a public good be cast aside in favor
of market-based pricing.3 In an increasingly globalized world where goods
and services are circulating freely, it is logical to suppose that water, which
flows from willing sellers to willing buyers within nations, will also flow
across international boundaries. Further, the market model has great
appeal. Besides attracting academic theorists to their elegance and
simplicity, public choice approaches also appeal to the powerful, profitoriented industrial and economic interests who profit from favorable
contemporary changes to free and open trading.
This article focuses upon a comparison of states and markets in
management of transboundary water. Borders are particularly attractive as
sites for such a study, tending to be areas of opportunity and innovation,
and serving as harbingers of more general change. Moreover,
transboundary water has long presented problems to nation states due to
system-wide impacts of isolated actions on shared river basins and
aquifers. Nation states have struggled mightily to overcome the
transboundary problem, as reflected in the more than 256 international
laws and treaties dealing with water issues.' The ineffectiveness of these
laws and treaties would provide bright prospects for the utilization of
market models were they better suited for these kinds of problems.
In different sections of the article, the fundamental distinguishing
features of the state-centric and market models are listed. Both approaches
will be evaluated with respect to three criteria:
1. Explanatorypower: Does it closely model observable real-world
processes and institutions?
2. Problem solving capacity: Does it provide descriptions and
solutions that make problems easier to deal with?
3. Democratic implications:Does it provide an adequate perception
of democracy and does it facilitate and enhance democratic
practices?

3. See Kirkpatrick Sale, Liquid Asset, NATION, May 11, 1998, at 7,58.
4. See Joseph F. DiMento, Black Sea Environmental Management: Prospectsfor New
Paradigms in Transitional Contexts, in REFLECTIONS ON WATER: NEW APPROACHES TO

TRANSBoUNDARY CONtruCTS AND COOPERATION 488,492 (Joachim Blatter & Helen Ingram
eds., forthcoming Dec. 2000).
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The article starts with the fundamental features of the state-centric
model for the governance of transboundary water resources. Through a
historical analysis of the development of institutions of transboundary
water governance in Europe and North America, it shows that the statecentric model was in congruence with reality until the 1960s. Since then,
this approach has failed to capture the increasingly complex web of
institutions and interactions that currently characterizes transboundary
water politics. Insufficient performance with respect to problem solving
and the degree of democratic responsiveness will be identified as the
driving forces that have changed the institutional setting in transboundary
water politics. The section doses by making the point that the state-centric
model is not just losing its hegemony empirically but, from a normative
standpoint, is justifiably being replaced due to a failure to provide the
conceptual underpinnings for institutions of efficient and democratically
accountable governance.
The article will then turn to a more conceptual analysis of the club
model, which derives from market based concepts. Lacking actual
evidence, it will examine the work of Frey and Eichenberger, prominent
public choice scholars who have gotten a good deal of attention in Europe
and North America for proposing "functional, overlapping, and competing
jurisdictions (FOCJ)."s After outlining the general features of this proposal,
the article will evaluate FOCJ in terms of our three evaluation criteria. It
will find that FOCJ might help overcome some problems of the state-centric
approach but probably will have serious negative side effects in respect to
problem solving and democratic practices. These side effects consist of
deepening local rifts and the undermining of democratic citizenship in
favor of pure consumerism. Our conclusion makes a case for more complex
models that include a broader variety of political actors, institutions, and
modes of water resources governance.
STATE-CENTRIC APPROACHES
Most of the literature on transboundary water management in the
twentieth century has taken for granted that the governments of nation
states are responsible for building institutions of governance for
transboundary water resources. In this regard, those who support the
sovereign state include international lawyers, diplomats, bureaucrats,
planners, and technocrats who are influential in adapting institutions to the

5. Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, FOCI: Competitive GovernmentsforEurope, 16
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 315,322 (1996).
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changing international order.' Moreover, the state-centric model still
dominates the thinking of many international water resources specialists,
who continue to recommend international water resources basin
commissions that are accountable to sovereign governments staffed by
bureaucratic experts!
The theoretical foundation of the state-centric approach can be
briefly summarized as follows. Institutions of governance are the

instruments of political communities to serve the common good. History
has led to the dominance of nations as basic units for political communities.
The sovereign nation state, which is territorially defined and serves

multiple purposes, including representing the will of the people, is the only
legitimate actor or agent for the national interest in the international arena.
The central government is the hierarchical power capable of implementing
international agreements in the domestic arena. While for some purposes
power may be decentralized to particular national agencies or to lower

levels of government, the formal structure remains hierarchical.8
The state-centric approach is deeply entrenched in concepts
originating from the Enlightenment. Ideally, the "imagined community"
of the nation makes it possible to overcome the old divisions of class and
religion and ensures the equality of all citizens. The aggregated will of the
people is concentrated in the national center-either by a parliament (the
Westminster model) or a president (the Napoleonic model). The national
government and the bureaucracy are seen as instrumental to implementing
this will of the people and, therefore, have the legitimate monopoly to
coerce within the domestic realm and to promote the national interest in
the international realm. Even in non-unitarian, federal states like the United
States or Germany, the basis for political representation is the territorial
unit (electoral districts). In almost all modem nation states, citizenship is
defined on the basis of territory; therefore, geographical borders are
important lines of demarcation for the political community. They are
central for the security and identity of nations and nation states.
Development of the modem nation state has gone hand in hand
with the rise of bureaucracy. The coercive power held by the nation state
is exercised through trained experts who are bound by rules derived
rationally and applied consistently. Concepts of accountability and
legitimacy follow a dear-cut, linear logic of representation: from the people
6. See Joachim Blatter et al., Emerging Approaches to Comprehend ChangingGlobal
Contexts, in REPLECFONSONWATER: NEW APROACHESTOTRANSBOUNDARYCONFUCTSAND

COOPERATION, supra note 4, at 1, 6,17-19.
7.

IT
See I NuRrr Kucrr

AL, INSTIUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS FOR THE MANAGEMENT OF

TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 39 (1998).
8. SeefHerbert A. Simon, TheArchitectureofComplexfty, 106PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 467,
481-42 (1%2).
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to parliament or president, then to the government bureaucracy. Modes of
control follow the same linear logic: parliament sets general rules that are
applied by the bureaucracy and have to be followed by the citizens. When
this linear logic is transferred into the international realm, the chain of
indirect representation and control is lengthened. Rather than the directly
elected parliament setting the general rules, the officials of the central
governments come together and negotiate the principles, norms, rules, and
decision making procedures that provide the basis for an international
regime 9 Furthermore, a commission with a legal and technocratic
apparatus is created for the day-to-day management. This apparatus works
on the basis of the logic of deduction: applying general norms from
international law and specific provisions of international treaties, or
applying laws of physics through technical solutions. The use of deductive
logic helps to overcome nationalistic and egoistic interests of the
participating states.
In sum, the formation of preferences in state-centric approaches
always begins with territorially defined units. The basis for aggregation of
interests as well as the application of rules follows formal hierarchical lines.
The arena of cross-border interaction is dominated by diplomats,
bureaucrats, and technocrats who are designated by national governments.
From the state-centrist point of view, the international activities of subnational actors are often classified as "deviant behavior" 10 undermining the
power of the nation state or threatening to disrupt the conduct of foreign
affairs. " Involvement in international aggregations is seen as restricting the
bargaining flexibility of the national negotiators and as an obstacle to
implementing international agreements. Even in federal systems, it has
been taken for granted that the state is to speak as one nation beyond
national boundaries.'
In the following historical overview of the development of
transboundary water institutions in Europe and North America, we show
the initial strength and later weakness of the state-centric model While the
concept worked well in both a descriptive and prescriptive sense early in
the development of transboundary water management institutions, it has
more recently lostboth explanatory power and prescriptive usefulness. The
section closes by evaluating the state-centric model in terms of our three

9. See the examples in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 2-5 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).

10. See generallyBrian Hocking, Regional Governmentsand InternationalAffairs: Foreign
Policy Problem or Deviant Behavior?, 41 INT'LJ. 477 (1986).
11. See John D. Stempel, Losing It: The Decentralizationof American ForeignPolicy, 64J.
ST. GOV'T 122,122-23 (1991).
12. See Ivo D. DUcHACEyK, THE TERRrroRIAL DIMENSION OF POLTIcS: WrTHIN, AMONG,
AND ACROSS NATIONS 248-51 (1986).
13. See id. at 118.
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criteria-explanatory power, problem solving capacity, and implications
for democracy-and finds the state-centric model to be seriously wanting.
Sovereign Approaches to Transboundary Water Management
The state-centrist approach is congruent with the emergence of
transboundary water resources institutions, at least until the 1960s. As
described below, transboundary water management in North America and
Europe has been entrusted by the central governments to technical
commissions with limited autonomy. These commissions were the first
mechanisms for cooperative and joint problem solving, but they were
almost always designed to be instruments of central governments.
Therefore, their success and failure depend very much on the political will
of those central governments.
Once the territorial boundaries of the modem nation states were
stabilized (at least in the Western world) and borderlands were no longer
at the forefront of military conflict, cooperation across borders began to be
institutionalized. In transboundary water resources, we find some of the
oldest examples of such cooperation. At the U.S.-Canadian border, the
oldest, and most visible and respected joint institution is the International
Joint Commission (IJC), founded by the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909'4.
It was assigned four functions:
1. administrative;
2. quasi-judicial: passing judgment upon applications for
permission to use, divert, or obstruct treaty waters;
3. arbitral: making binding decisions with respect to disputes
between the two countries; and
4. investigative: examining any differences arising along the
common boundary.'5
At theUS.-Mexico Border, an International Boundary Commission17
was established in 1899.16 The 1944 United States-Mexico Water Treaty
changed the name of this commission to the International Boundary and
Water Commission (IBWC) and enlarged its powers to include resolution

14. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters between the United States and Canada, Jan.

11, 1909, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 36 Stat. 2449.
15.

See WILLIAM R. WILLOUGHBY, THE JOINT ORGANIZATIONS OF CANADA AND THE

UNITED STATES 17-18 (1979).
16. Stephen Mumme, Innovationand Reform in Transboundary Resource Management:A
CriticalLook at the InternationalBoundaryand WaterCommission, United Statesand Mexico, 33
NAT. RESOURCES J. 93,94 (1993).
17. Treaty Regarding Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the
Rio Grande, Feb. 3,1944, U.S.-Mex., 59 Stat. 1219.
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of disputes over water use.'8 The functions of the Commission are explicitly
defined and technically narrow, falling within three broad categories: (a)
administration, (b) adjudication, and (c) liaison-investigation.19
In Europe, the initial process of institution building for
transboundary issues was interrupted by the World Wars, after the creation
of the Central Commission for Navigation on the River Rhine in 1915.20 For
the River Rhine, the major international commissions were set up in the
two decades following the Second World War. France and Germany signed
treaties that established the Commissions for the Development of the
Upper Rhine in 1956 and 1969 with the purpose of maximizing usage of the
waters for navigation and electricity production.21 In 1963 the International
Commission for the Protection of the River Rhine against Pollution was
created by the national governments of Switzerland, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.' It was assigned the following
functions: (a) investigating the scope and sources of pollution, and (b)
preparing recommendations and foundations for agreements among the
participating states.' Similar institutionalization processes can be observed
at Lake Constance. Until the 1960s, the fisheries commission, created
through a treaty in 1893, was the only intergovernmental institution in the
region.24 In 1960, the International Commission for the Protection of Lake
Constance was established as a result of an international agreement among
the German Linder Baden-Wiirttemberg und Bayern, the Swiss
Eidgenossenschaft,the Swiss Cantons of St. Gallen and Thurgau, and the
Republic of Austria.25
Sovereignty and the Criterion of Explanatory Power
Beginning in the 1960s, state-created transboundary water
institutions have faced a variety of criticisms. Most can be traced to the
perceived incapacity of existing transboundary institutions to solve
problems. More fundamentally, these criticisms have been fueled by

18. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, TransboundaryEnvironmentalRelationsbetueen Mexico and
the United States, in TRANSATLANTIC COLLOQUY ON CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS: EUROPEAN
AND NORTH AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES 191,191-93 (S. Ercmann ed., 1987).
19. See Mumme, supra note 16, at 95.
20. JOACHIM BLATTER, GRENZOBERSCHREITENDE ZUSAMMENARBEIT IM GEWASSER-UND
AuENScHurz AM OBERRHEIN 10 (1994).

21. See id.
22. See id. at 11.
23. See id.
24. See HEINZ MOLLER-SCHNEGG, GRENZOBERSCHREITENDE ZUSAMMENARBEIT IN DER
BODENSEEREGION, BESTANDESAUFNAHME UND EINScHATzUNG DER VERFLECHTUNGEN
POLMSCH-ADMINISTRATIVERUNDORGANISIERTERPRVATERGRUPPIERUNGEN 122-23 (1994).

25. See id. at123.
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expressions of broad democratic values from emerging grassroots
environmental movements that challenge existing technocratic policies.
Scientific and public controversy revolves around the question of
whether a more integrated, supra-national regulation of transboundary
watercourses is necessary and feasible. Ecologists, planners, and many
international lawyers support a system of more autonomous supranational agencies having much broader mandates. Dworsky and Utton, for
example, advocate central control and "a binational institution to
administer and implement the control and regulation of water pollution."'
Other "realistic" scholars in political science and law, as well as
practitioners, stress the importance of the commitment of the sovereign
nation-states and prefer depoliticized technical co-operation and carefully
limited increases in the scope of the mandates. '
Neither of these positions has been supported by real-world
experiments. Attempts in the seventies to install central supra-national
agencies failed. The European Commission made such a proposal for the
River Rhine, but it was neglected by the European Council.' Equally
disturbing, analysts found little correlation between the legal authority of
institutions to solve problems and their performance in doing so. At least
on paper, the International Boundary Waters Commission (IBWC) is
among the most powerful transboundary water management institutions
in the world. However, the waters under its jurisdiction were steadily
degraded over a number of years" until the situation emerged as a "crisis"
during the NAFTA side-agreements debate in the U.S. Congress.
On the other side, the position advocating depoliticized diplomacy
by technical experts came under more and more pressureO Sanchez states,
"it is more evident every day that the isolated, autonomous, and
authoritarian operations of the Commission [IBWC], do not meet the
current demands and needs of the border communities."31 Ingram and
White criticize the IBWC for operating under a cloak of diplomatic secrecy,
which limits opportunities for local citizens-exposed to contamination
and water shortages-to either understand or act to ameliorate these

26. Leonard B. Dworsky & Albert E. Utton, Assessing North America's Managementof
Its TransboundaryWaters, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.413,427 (1993).
27. See Alan M. Schwartz &Joseph T. Jockel, IncreasingPowerofIIC,INT'LPERSP., Nov.Dec. 1983, at 3, 3-4.
28. See BLATMER, supranote 20, at 14.
29. See Helen Ingram & David R. White, InternationalBoundary and Water Commission:
An InstitutionalMismatchfor Resolving TransboundaryWater Problems,33 NAT. RESOURCESJ.

153,153,157(1993).

30. See generally Roberto Sanchez, Public Participationand the IBWC: Challenges and
Options, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.283 (1993).
31. Id. at 285.
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problems. 32 A study on environmental cooperation at Lake Constance
concluded that there was no cross-border policy; in its stead was found
only a cross-border administration of environmental problems.3
In place of such weak state-centered approaches, other crossboundary relationships have begun to evolve in ways not at all anticipated
by state-centrist theory. A dense web of interactions across borders is
leading to networks and ties that are proving to be the backbones and the
muscles for innovative management of transboundary resources. Several
elements have contributed to this process.
First, new agreements were signed, introducing wide-ranging
programs: in the Great Lakes region, the Water Quality Agreements of 1972
and 1978 and a Protocol in 19879" and, for the Rhine River, the 1976
Working Program and the Rhine 2000 Action Program in 1987.' The
signing of guidelines for the Protection of Lake Constance in 1967 and their
revision in 1987 were milestones in that region.' The introduction of an
ecosystem approach in the late eighties enlarged the programmatic scope
of the water commissions significantly. Notably, the impetus for such
agreements has not come largely from a process of bureaucratic planning
but from NGOs.
Second, complex and comprehensive structures evolved within
and around the commissions. The International Commission for the
Protection of the River Rhine against Pollution provides an impressive
example. The Commission itself contains an assembly, a secretariat, a
president, a coordinating group, several working groups, and even more
specialized sub-groups. Parallel and complementary mechanisms are the
Conference of the Ministers of the Riparian States on the international level
and coordinating commissions, such as the Deutsche Kommission zur
ReinhaltungdesRheins andtheArbeitsgemeinschaftderLiinderzur Reinhaltung
des Rheins in Germany, on the national level.37

32. See Ingram & White, supra note 29, at 156.
33. See
ROLAND SCHERER & HEINZ MOLLER, ERFOLGSBEDINGUNGEN
GRENZOBERSCHREITENDER ZUSAMMENARBEIT IM UMWELTSCHUTZ, DAS BEISPIEL

BODENSEEREGION 125 (1994).
34. See Leonard B. Dworsky, Ecosystem Management: GreatLakes Perspectives,33 NAT.
REsouRcEsj. 349,351 (1993).

35. See BLATTER, supra note 20, at 11.
36.

See

1

INTERNATIONALE

GEWASsERSCHUTZKOMMISSION

FOR

DEN BODENSEE,

RICHTLINIEN FOR DIE REINHALTUNG DES BODENSEES (1967); 27 INTERNATIONALE
GEWASSERSCHUTZKOMMISSION FOR DEN BODENSEE, RIcHTLINIEN FOR DIE REINHALTUNG DES
BODENSEES (1987).

37.

See BLATrER, supra note 20, at 10-11. The importance of sub-national influence in

formally international commissions and negotiations has also been shown by Mumme. See
Stephen P. Mumme, State Influence in Foreign Policy Making: Water Related Environmental
Disputesalong the United States-Mexico Border,38 W. PoL Q. 620,621 (1985). See also Helen
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Third, a certain kind of identity among the participants and across
national backgrounds evolved during the process. Haas labels this
phenomenon an "epistemic community," which he defines as "a specific
community of experts sharing a belief in a common set of cause-and-effect
relationships as well as common values to which policies governing these
relationships will be applied."' Experts were not alone in forming crossborder communities and in leading the way towards joint action. Growing
cross-border relationships between environmental NGOs have been
recognized in Europe and North American, and their importanceespecially as agenda setters, producers of innovative ideas, and monitors
of actual events in the field-is widely acknowledged. 9
Fourth, and most important, many new transnational and crossborder linkages and institutions emerged. In Europe, the sixties and the
early seventies brought a first wave of cross-border contacts and
institutions of sub-national actors. In the Upper Rhine Valley the best
known institution, the Regio Basiliensis,was founded in 1963, followed in
1972 by the creation of intergovernmental commissions, the Comiti
Tripartite (French-Swiss-German) and the Comiti Bipartite (FrenchGerman).' Although these commissions were created by an exchange of
letters between the central governments, their members are sub-national
governmental units of the three nation states.41 These intergovernmental
commissions installed several working groups that later fused into the
Upper Rhine Conference. Within the working group "Environment," a
committee of experts was formed to work on the topics of water quality
and hydro-biology.' During the 1960s, the water utilities along the Rhine

M. Ingram & Suzanne Fiederlein, State Government Officials' Role in U.S./Mexico
Transboundary Resource Issues, 28 NAT. RESOURCES J. 421 (1988); NElL A. SWANSON,
CoNFLICroVERTHECOLUMIA:THECANADIANBAcKGRoUNDToANHISToRICTRFATY(1979);

JOACHIM BLATrER, GRENZUEBERSCHREITENDE ZUSAMMENARBEIT IMGEWAESSERSCHUTZ AM
BODENSEE 39 (1994) [hereinafter BLATrER-BODENSEE].

38. Peter M. Haas, Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean
PollutionControl, 43 INT'L ORG. 377, 384 (1989).
39. See generally HELEN INGRAM ET AL., DIVIDED WATERS: BRIDGING THE U.S.-MEXICO
BORDER (1995). See also ROLAND SCHERER & JOACHIM BLATTER, PRECONDITIONS FOR
SUCCESSFUL CROSS-BORDER COOPERATION ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES: RESEARCH RESULTS

AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A BETTER PRACTICE (1995); Mimi Larson Becker, The

InternationalJoint Commission and PublicParticipation:Past Experiences, PresentChallenges,
Future Tasks, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 235 (1993).
40. SeeJames Wesley Scott, TransborderCooperation,RegionalInitiatives,and Sovereignty
Conflicts in Western Europe: The Case of the Upper Rhine Valley, PUBLIUS, Winter 1989, at 139,
144.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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formed international associations to lobby for better protection of water

quality."
The late 1960s and early 1970s witnessed the creation of new crossborder commissions at Lake Constance: a regulatory body for
shipping/navigation on the lake and a commission for land planning.' The
commissions were established by international treaties or exchanges of
notes between the respective federal governments. Together with the
Austrian Land of Vorarlberg, the commission for land planning produced
the Internationales Leitbild fPr das Bodenseegebiet (a comprehensive
development program for the Lake Constance area) during the early
eighties." This program gave much attention to water issues. Furthermore,
in 1972 the government of Baden-Wiirttemberg called a meeting of the
political leaders of the Linder and Cantons in Konstanz that gave birth to
the InternationaleKonferenz der Regierungschefs der Bodenseelinder(IBK)-a
conference without any formal agreement or parliamentary ratification."
The IBK developed a more sophisticated structure in the late seventies,
with a standing committee and working groups. During its first 15 years,
the IBK was mainly concerned with water issues.'
Expanded cross-border links and institutions emerged in the
climate of change at the end of the 1980s. Stimulated by continental
integration processes like the European Internal Market (1992), 4' private
and public actors in border regions were looking for alliances and
partners-and discovered the other side of the border. Public-private
regional associations were strengthened (as in the Upper Rhine Valley) or
newly founded (like the Bodenseerat at Lake Constance). Continental
integration also brought the INTERREG-initiative by the European Union
in 1991. This program provides money for regional cross-border projects.
To receive money from the INTERREG-initiative, the border regions must
present operational programs, and new organizational structures have
been established to decide which projects will be funded. The steering
committees for the INTERREG II programs consist mainly of regional
officials, but the federal governments and the EU commission also

44.
45.
46.
47.

See BLATrER, supra note 20, at 12-15.
See BLATTER-BODENSEE, supra note 37, at 39.
See id.
See id.

48. See id.
49. SeeJoachim Blatter, ExplainingCrossborderCooperation:ABorder-FocusedandBorderExternal Approach, J.BORDERLANDS STUD., Spring & Fall 1997, at 151,160.
50. See Joachim K. Blatter, Entgrenzung der Staatenwelt? Politische
Institutionenbildung in grenzilberschreitenden Regionen in Europa und Nordamerika 11314 (1998) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Martin Luther Universittt Halle-Wittenberg) (on
file with author).
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participate.' All these new linkages and institutions are strongly concerned
with and involved in transboundary water issues.
Similar developments at the national borders occurred in North
America. The longest tradition of sub-national cross-border cooperation
exists in the eastern U.S.-Canadian border region and at the Great Lakes.'
However, attempts to establish institutionalized linkages between subnational units were initiated at the U.S.-Mexican border as early as 1964,
when the Commission of the Californias was founded.' In the early
seventies, the cities of San Diego and Tijuana developed closer contacts, a
process which culminated in the founding of the cross-border association
Fronterasde las Californias1976.54 Finally, the Border Governors Conference
was established in 1980. This group of sub-national leaders developed later
into a permanent institution holding annual meetings and setting up
several working groups.' As in Europe, these sub-national linkages gained
real momentum with the introduction of and subsequent debates about
free trade regimes on a continental level; for example, with the Free Trade
Agreement (FTA 1988) between Canada and the United Statese and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA 1994) between the United
States, Canada and Mexico.' Even in border regions where attempts to
form sub-national cross-border linkages had previously failed, new
initiatives and institutions have sprouted and taken root. This was the case
in the Pacific Northwest where many activities to create a cross-border
region called Cascadia occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s.' A
meeting of legislators from the Canadian provinces of British Columbia
and Alberta and the U.S. states of Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and
Montana resulted in the founding of the Pacific Northwest Economic

51. See id. at 114.
52. See generally Elliot J.Feldman &Lily GardnerFeldman, The Impact of Federalismon
the Organizationof CanadianForeign Policy, PUBLIUs, Fall 1984, at 33. See also Martin Lubin,
The Routinization of Cross-Border Interactions: An Overview of NEG/ECP Structures and
Activities, in STATES AND PROVINCES INTHE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY 167 (Douglas M.
Brown & Earl H. Fry, eds., 1993); Donald K. Alper, Recent Trends in U.S.-Canada Regional
Diplomacy, in ACROSS BOUNDARIES: TRANSBORDER INTERACTION IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE 119,120 (Oscar J.Martinez ed., 1986).
53. See T. ZANE REEVES, THE U.S.-MExICO BORDER COMMISSIONS: AN OVERVIEW AND
AGENDA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 4 (Center for Inter-American & Border Studies, 1984).
54. See Blatter, supra note 50, at 177.
55. See XII BORDER GOVERNORS' CONFERENCE: UNITED STATES-MEXICO, PHOENIX,
ARIZONA 4 (MAY 25-27,1994).
56. See Donald K. Alper, The Idea of Cascadia:Emergent TransborderRegionalism in the
Pacific Northwest-Western Canada,J.BORDERLANDS STUD., Fall 1996, at 1, 9.
57. See Blatter, supra note 49, at 160.
58. See Alper, supra note 56, at 7.
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Region (PNWER) in 1991.? Focused mainly on economic issues, PNWER
also created working groups concerned with water-relevant issues like
environmental technology, tourism, and agriculture.W Many other activities
followed in the wake of a failed proposal by two national legislators for a
Cascadia Corridor Commission.' This commission was envisioned as an
advisory body with the authority to establish a forum to coordinate
consideration of regional issues in the Cascadia region by local, state,
provincial, regional, and national governments and to develop a strategic
plan for environmentally sound economic development in the Cascadia
region.' Washington State and British Columbia resisted the installation
of such a commission because they feared a too powerful federal
involvement.' Instead they established an Environmental Cooperation
Council in May 1992."
On the U.S.-Mexican border, NAFTA employed side-agreements
to establish two new institutions to focus on the border and on water
issues. These were the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission
(BECC) and the North American Development Bank (NADBANK), both
established in 1994.1 Their responsibility is to address problems related to
water supply, wastewater treatment, and municipal solid waste
management on the U.S.-Mexico border." The NADBANK's task is to
facilitate financing for the development, execution, and operation of
projects that have been environmentally and technically tested and certified
by the BECC.67 Both institutions have advisory boards and processes that

59. See id. at 5-7.
60. See id. at 6.
61. See id. at 9.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. SeeJamie Alley, The British Columbia/WashingtonEnvironmentalCooperationCouncil:
An Evolving Model of CanadalU.S. Interjurisdictional Cooperation, in ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEmENTON NORTH AMERICAS BORDERS 53 (Richard Kiy & John D. Wirth eds., 1998).
65. See Blatter, supra note 49, at 161.
66. See Border Environment Cooperation Commission, BECC'S Functions(visited Feb.

1, 2000) (http://www.cocef.org/antecedentes/ing43.htm; North American Development
Bank, General Overview (visited Feb. 1, 2000) thttp://www.nadbank.org/english/

aboutbank/Overview/OverviewText.htm,. Both organizations are operating under a
November 1993 agreement between the United States and Mexican governments.
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the United Mexican States Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment
Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank, Jan. 1, 1994,
U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 12,516.

67. See Border Environment Cooperation Commission, BECC'S Functions (visited Feb.
1,2000) (http://www.cocef.org/antecedentes/ing43.htm,; North American Development
Bank, General Overview (visited Feb. 1, 2000) (http://www.nadbank.org/english/
about-bank/Overview/Overview_Text.htm .
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provide for broad representation and participation of all levels of
government, private investors and environmental groups.' The debate on
NAFTA and the existence of BECC and NADBANK stimulated many
cross-border activities at the U.S.-Mexico border. One example is the 1993
signing of a Letter of Agreement between the City of Tijuana and the City
of San Diego, constituting a Binational Planning and Coordinating
Committee and a close working relationship in many fields, such as water
and sewage systems.6
These expansionary developments were not what many statecentered experts on transboundary water management had envisioned.
Dworsky and Utton, for example, declare, "One of the objectives of the
search for a strengthened boundary region institution is to avoid or restrain
the proliferation of institutions designed to meet unmet or evolving
problems in the region."7" For Caldwell it is a "fundamental paradox" that,
while it is acknowledged that goals are "achievable only through a degree
of coordinated action that existing institutional arrangements are unlikely
to provide," the role of sub-national and national actors in their
implementation is growing. ' It might well be that more autonomous
supra-national agencies for managing transboundary water issues would
be helpful. But the advocates of such autonomous agencies are too
narrowly focused on the formal power of these institutions and fail to
capture the reality of complex integrated governance in spaces of
intermestic politics.
These examples from the field of transboundary water
management clearly illustrate how far existing structures have moved from
the models of international politics in which central governments act on
behalf of monolithic nation states and in strategic defense of the national
interest. The world has witnessed an increasing complexity in definitions
of problems and interests, accompanied by both a multiplication of

68. See Border Environment Cooperation Commission, BECC Organizationand
Management(visited Feb. 1,2000) (http://www.cocef.org/antecedentes/ing45.htm,; North
American Development Bank, General Overview (visited Feb. 1, 2000)
(http://www.nadbank.org/english/about-bank/Overview/Overview-Text.htm,. Seealso
Stephen P. Mumme, The North American Commissionfor Environmental Cooperationand the
United States-MexicanBorderRegion: The CaseofAir and Water, TRANSBOUNDARYRESOURCES
REP., Summer 1995, at 1,1-3; Raul Hinojosa-Ojeda, The North American Development Bank,
ForgingNew Directions in Regional Integration Policy, 60 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N 301, 301-04

(1994).
69. See Letter of Agreement between the City of Tijuana and the City of San Diego in
the Field of Binational Planning and Coordination, Apr. 14, 1993, San Diego, Cal.,

U.S.-Tijuana, Mexico.
70. Dworsky & Utton, supranote 26, at 447.
71. Lynton K. Caldwell, Emerging Boundary EnvironmentalChallenges and Institutional
Issues: Canadaand the United States, 33 NAT. REsoURcEs J.9,17 (1993).
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involved actors and by the differentiation of institutional systems within
and across national boundaries. When territorial boundaries lose
significance, international and domestic politics become more and more
interwoven. This cannot easily be interpreted as centralization or
decentralization: globalization and internationalization go hand in hand
with "localizing (of) foreign policy"' and the emergence of intermestic
politics. The resulting complexity and confusion provide a fruitful ground
for discussion and proposals that would aim to restore some ordering
principles and some form of re-integration to the art of governance.
Sovereignty and the Problem Solving and Democracy Criteria
The inability of the state-centric model to adequately capture
reality was explicitly addressed in the foregoing historical analysis of
transboundary water institutions in Europe and North America. In this
section we will more directly examine the criteria of problem solving
capacity and enhancement of democracy. They will be considered jointly
because they are inextricably intertwined. Briefly stated, the essential
problem of a model based only on nation states and their international
interactions and institutions is the trade off between the goals of problem
solving and democratic responsiveness. International institutions that
become more effective decision making systems by gaining more
autonomy also tend to become technocratic regulatory regimes, a fact that
limits democratic participation. Regulatory regimes may well be en vogue
and may have some legitimacy in specific fields.' Nevertheless, there is a
great danger that such autonomous regulatory regimes will rely on old
technocratic paradigms and become insulated from innovative concepts
and emerging new interests.
On the other hand, if autonomy is withheld from transboundary
management institutions and sovereign and democratic states continue to
exercise their authority, then many problems will not be effectively
addressed. All participating democratic states, which will be forced by their
nation-wide constituencies to act in an egoistic manner, will have veto
rights and only win-win situations will result in joint activities. Each of the
older binational or international water commissions we describe is a
specific version of a compromise between the effectiveness/democracy
poles and is often unable to fulfill either of those criteria. Thinking only in
terms of sovereign hierarchical political entities, either on the national level
or on the international level, does not lead us out of the dilemma between

72. See BRIAN HOCKING, LOCALIZING FOREIGN POLICY: NON-CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS
AND MULTILAYERED DIPLOMACY 31-69 (1993).
73. See GIANDOMENIcO MAJONE, REGULATING EUROPE 1-5 (1996).
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the apparently antagonistic goals of effective governance and democratic
governance.
The possibility of grassroots democracy arising from a regional
binational or multinational consensus in favor of some water related action
is also thwarted in the state-centric model. Cross-national regional opinion
may not weigh heavily in the larger framework of nation state relations.
Regional issues may never make it onto the necessary agendas, and even
if nation states focus on subjects with strong grassroots backing, decisions
may not be made on the basis of the interests of border region citizens.
THE MARKET APPROACH: FOCJ
The antithesis of the centrist model for managing transboundary
natural resources and other intermestic problems is provided by public
choice scholars. Explicitly or implicitly, they propose three fundamental
transformations:
1. from historically determined government structures to ones
efficiently constructed through citizens' free choice,
2. from territory to function as the focal point of political
integration or governance, and,
3. from hierarchies to markets as the main mechanism of
integration or mode of governance.
These ideas have been elaborated upon by scholars in both Europe
and North America. 74 Reasons for their appeal include the sponsorship of
economics, which is considered theoretically advanced among social
science disciplines, and the backing of commercial and developmental
interests. Further support derives from the critiques to which the centrist
model has been subjected. The public choice model, at least at first glance,
appears to better fit reality. Moreover, it effectively responds to criticisms
that existing transboundary water resource institutions are closed and
undemocratic.
For clarity and simplicity of analysis, we have chosen to focus on
one particular formulation advanced by two Swiss scholars as a proposal
for a future European Constitution. Frey and Eichenberger propose
"functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions (FOCJ). " They
develop their concept based on normative economic theories promoting
individual choice and competition as principal elements for future forms

74. See, e.g., DAVID J. ELKINS, BEYOND SOVEREIGNTY. TERRITORY AND POLITICAL
-Fmsr CENTURY (1995).
ECONOMY IN THE TwE
75. Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 5, at 322.
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of governance.7 6 Essentially, they build on Buchanan's theory of dubs in
neo-classical public finance and the economic theory of federalism.' They
present FOCJ as a basis for a European system of governance. The central
idea is to establish an "open and competitive (market for politics)."' Such
a market for politics should be established by constitutionally providing
the right of citizens to form FOCJ within and across national boundaries.
FOCJ can be defined as:
" Functional(the new political units extend over areas defined by
the tasks to be fulfilled);
• Overlapping(many different tasks exist within the crisscrossing
boundaries of corresponding governmental units);
• Competing (individuals and/or communities may choose, via
initiatives and referenda, which governmental unit they want to

join); and
" Jurisdictions (established units are governmental, having
enforcement power and can, in particular, levy taxes)."
According to their proponents, the size and geographic scope of
FOCJ are functionally defined and are, therefore, especially efficient. FOCJ
emerge in response to diverse geographic spaces of specific
problems/tasks, but also to exploit "economics of scale."'
FOCJ need not be geographically separated and can actually
overlap in two ways: (a) two or more FOCJ catering to the same function
may geographically intersect, or (b) FOCJ catering to different functions
may overlap."1 Competition within and between FOCJ is the mechanism
that ensures that FOCJ governments conform closely to their members'
preferences.' The possibility that members may leave mimics market
competition and the right to vote establishes political competition-' The
geographically non-exclusive and functionally specific nature of FOCJ
permits voluntary departure from the organization to play a significantly
greater role than in conventional forms of federalism. The former aspect
allows citizens and communities to change their membership without

76. See id. at 315-16. The German version of their proposal starts with the following
sentence: "Wettbewerb schafft Wohlstand" (competition creates welfare). See Reiner
Eichenberger, Eine "fanfleFreiheit"far Europa: Stlirkung des politischen Wettbewerbs durch
"FOCJ," 45 ZMTSHR FOR WMTSCHAMPoLrnK 110,110 (1996).
77. See Alessandra Casella & Bruno Frey, Federalismand Clubs: Towards an Economic
Theory of OverlappingPoliticalJurisdictions,36 EUR. EcoN. REv. 639,640-44 (1992).

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 5, at 315.
See id. at 316.
See id. at 317.
See id.
See id. at 318.
See id.
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moving physically; the latter makes partial secession possible." For these
reasons, people servedby FOCJ should directly elect those managing them.
Furthermore, they should be given the right to initiate popular referenda.'
We have criticized the state-centrist theory for providing neither an
adequate description of reality nor a useful model for improvement of
transboundary water management. Now, a similar examination of FOCJ is
in order.
Explanatory Power
We turn first to the explanatory power of the concept. Does it
provide a model that closely resembles the new processes and institutions
we can observe in reality and does it identify the critical variables that drive
those institution-building processes?'M On first inspection, the new
institution-building processes in cross-border water related policy areas
appear to fit the model well. Not only are they distinguished by a diversity
of geographic foci, these institutions have been created with reference to
functional imperatives and they overlap in ways described by Frey and
Eichenberger. s7
Two sorts of functional orientations occurred early on. First,
international commissions formed boards on a watershed basis. For
example, while the IJC has a mandate for the entire U.S.-Canadian border
that encompasses a multitude of separate problems, it has installed special
boards for different water systems along the border. Second, special
utilities like sewage treatment plants have been built and maintained on a
cross-border basis. Hydrological conditions and economics of scale were
the motivations to create a cross-border sewage treatment plant in the

84. See id.
85. See Eichenberger, supra note 76, at 115.
86. Since the authors primarily introduced their model for prescriptive purposes, the
issue must be addressed as to whether it is fair to impose the realism standard. However,
Frey &Eichenberger emphasize that theirs is "a realistic concept." See Frey &Eichenberger,
supra note 5, at 320. Another question might be whether it is correct to use the field of
transboundary water resources as a test case. The most compelling justification for doing
so is Eichenberger and Frey's own statement: "Besonders geeignet sind 'FOCJ' sodann fir
eine grenzfiberschreitende Zusammenarbeit." Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Eine
"fftnfte Freiheit" ffir Europa, Stfirkung des F.dderalismus durch "FOCI," NEUE ZORICHER
ZErrUNG, Feb. 6,1996, at 2. In the following parts of their newspaper article they mention
"Polizeilicher Umweltschutz" (environmental regulation) at Lake Constance and sewage
treatment as examples where FOCJ are especially useful. See id.
87. See Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 5, at 318-19.
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western part of the Lake Constance region.' There are several other
arrangements in the region in which neighboring municipalities joined
forces to treat their sewage.' Considerations for hydrological conditions
proved strong enough to overcome nationalistic attitudes and to result in
a joining of forces in the U.S.-Mexican borderlands. This is the case in
Ambos Nogales, a twin city at the border between Sonora and Arizona,'
as well as in the Tijuana River Valley, where the neighboring cities of San
Diego and Tijuana, together with the IBWC, set up an international sewage
treatment plant. 91
Until recently, these cross-border cooperations were characterized
by a strong involvement of national or binational agencies. More recently,
there have been some major changes. For instance, in the spring of 1996, an
international treaty was signed in Karlsruhe that allows municipalities to
create cross-border special districts based on public law.' Additionally, at
the U.S.-Mexican border, municipalities receive more responsibilities and
the capacity to deal with their common local affairs through BECC and
NADBANK.
Other developments go further in applying a functional approach
toward institution building. Some of them have been guided by notions of
bio-regions and watersheds, which appeal strongly to environmentalists.
The British Columbia-Washington State Environmental Cooperation
Council, the International Marine Science Panel and the Puget
Sound/Georgia Basin International Task Force are defining their areas of
activity on a watershed basis." Others refer to concepts of regional
economics like "innovative milieu"' and "regional networks"' and are

88. See MOLLER-SCHNEGG, supra note 24, at 172. Typical of the pragmatic approach to
cross-border cooperation in the Lake Constance region is the fact that the municipalities
first formed two special districts on each side of the border and signed a contact based on
private law. See id. Several years later the governments signed an international treaty that
officially legitimized the joint activity. See id.
89. See id. at 172-73.
90. See Ingram & White, supra note 29.
91. See Mumme, supra note 16, at 116-17 n.108.
92. See Blatter, supra note 50, at 118.
93. See Border Environment Cooperation Commission, BECC Organizationand
Management (visited Feb. 1,2000) http://www.cocef.org/antecedentes/ing45.htmr; North
American Development Bank, General Overview (visited Feb. 1, 2000)
4http://www.nadbank.org/english/about-bank/Overview/OverviewText.htm .
94.

See SHARED WATERS: THE VULNERABLE INLAND SEAS OF BRITISH COLUMBIA AND

WASHINGTON 2 (Puget Sound Water Quality Authority & British Columbia Ministry of the
Environment 1994).
95. See generally Denis Maillat, Territorial Dynamic, Innovative Milieus and Regional
Policy, 7 ENTREPRENEURSHIP & REGIONAL DEV. 157 (1995).
96. See generally REGIONAL NETWORKS, BORDER REGIONS AND EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

(R. Cappelin & P.W.J. Batey eds., 1993).
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stimulated by concepts like "the rise of the region-state."" In Cascadia
there are several initiatives in this direction and each of these commercedriven institutions has a different geographic locus. The Cascadia Corridor
Task Force and the Cascadia Economic Round Table focus on Cascadia
Main Street, a corridor linking Vancouver, Seattle and Portland; the Pacific
Northwest Economic Partnership brings together the province of British
Columbia and the state of Washington; and the Pacific Northwest
Economic Region contains four U.S. states and two Canadian provinces."
The cross-border institutions at Lake Constance and in the Upper
Rhine Valley also correspond to what FOCJ would expect. The territorial
loci of the regional cross-border institutions are very diverse. Figure 1
depicts a few of the cross-border institutions that have had an impact on
transboundary water management. Only the institutions with a clear focus
on Lake Constance are included; the overall picture on cross-border
institutions in the region is even more diverse." The oldest institution is the
InternationaleGewiisserschutzkommission fir den Bodensee (IGKB).1" This
commission for protecting Lake Constance against pollution is oriented
towards the entire watershed of the lake.' In comparison, the Internationale
Schiffahrtskommissionfir den Bodensee (ISKB), the commission for shipping
and navigation, is responsible only for the lake itself."m The DeutschSchweizerische Raumordnungskommission (DSRK), the land planning
commission, deals with the entire border between Germany and
1
The Internationale Bodenseekonferenz (IBK) and the
Switzerland. m
Bodenseeratfocus their activity on the Euregio." The newest institution, the
steering committee for the INTERREG-program Alpenrhein-Bodensee-

97. See generally Kenichi Ohmae, The Rise of the Region State, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring
1993, at 78.
98. See Blatter, supra note 49, at 160-61. For a map of the Cascadia region, see Internet
site: <http://www.cascadianet.com/ images/cascadia.map.gif>.
99. See BLATrFR-BODENSEE, supra note 37, at 156.
100. See id.

101. The Swiss Cantons of Graubfinden and Appenzell as well as the Fifedom of
Liechtenstein have been included informally into the activities of the Commission. See id.
at 6, 37. By this expansion the Commission includes de facto all relevant jurisdictions
within the watershed. See id. See also27INTERNATIONALEGEWASERSCHUTZKOMMION FOR

DEN BODENSEE, supra note 36, at 11. In a special section of these "Guidelines" the
commission addresses the problems of the inflows into Lake Constance. See id.
102. See MOLLER-ScHNEGG, supra note 24, at 116.
103. See Blatter, supra note 50, at 147.
104. See Horst Sund, Begrofung und Einleitung, in VOM BODENSEE-FORUM ZUM
BODENsEERAT 156,161 (Horst Sund et al. eds., 1992).
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Hochrhein,again has a different territorial definition and an overlap with
the neighboring INTERREG-program areas."'~
It seems obvious that notions like "variable geometry" constitute
a central characteristic of the new architecture of intermestic politics as
indicated by Frey and Eichenberger. But it is less clear which functional
logic is used to define the "geography of the problem," i.e., the
geographical space adequate for addressing the problem or for providing
a public good in an efficient manner. Frey and Eichenberger give the
impression that there exists a single correct "geography of the problem."'
For them it is not a physical, cultural, or social construct but is instead
defined by economic rationales of "fiscal equivalence" and "economies of
scale." "°TAvoiding "spillover" is not seen as the elimination of service
spillover from one territory to another territory but as a congruence of the
people who benefit from a particular public service and the people who
pay for it (fiscal equivalence)."o Since the people who pay for the public
service demand its effective supply, the government is stimulated to exploit
economies of scale and the size of FOCJis determined endogenously by the
benefits and costs to the members.' o Thus, it makes sense to accept new
members as long as this reduces the average price for the public good. That
means that the objective necessities of the production process determine the
size of FOCJ. For example, the economies of scale (and any elements which
influence costs) determine the best size of a sewage treatment plant and
sewer system, and the consumers will help to find this best size by
choosing between different governance units that offer connections to
sewer systems. Such a conception stipulates that there is one best size or
geographic area for specific service policies. Rationally calculating
consumers will lead the way to finding this ideal size.
Frey and Eichenberger ignore the multidimensionality and
interrelatedness of public policies/goods that dictate priorities based on

105.

See SEKRETARIAT DES BEGLEITEDEN AUSSCHU

s BEIMREGIERUNGSPRASIDIUM

TOBINGEN, GESCHAFrsORDNUNG DES BEGLEENDEN .Aussciussis zum

INTERREG II-

PROGRAM: "BODENSEE-HOCHRHEIN" (1995); GESCHAFrsoRDNUNGDESBEGLEFTAuSSCHussD
DER INTERREG PROGRAMME OBERRHMN MrE SOD I UND H.

106. See Frey &Eichenberger, supra note 5, at 317. Although the FOCJ concept is in line
with neoclassical argumentation and does not take into account any aspects of territory or
location directly, at least in the field of transboundary resources it seems obvious that,
independent from the logic of definition, a governance unit (e.g. for sewage treatment, for
shipping regulations and for setting drinkingwater standards) has geographicboundaries.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id.
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socially constructed goals and values.11 They are biased in favor of a "users
pay" definition of public goods.' This public choice logic is only one
possible way to define the "geography of the problem" and the size of the
governing unit, respectively. Real world transborder institutions usually
do not apply this logic in defining their geographical scope and their
membership size. Indeed, there is a trend towards more functional
solutions in the field of intermestic politics governing transboundary water
resources, but even in cases of strong local involvement, there is no clear
fiscal equivalence between those who benefit and those who pay. In the
Lake Constance case, one can assume that all people who live downstream
profit from the investment in sewage treatment plants. Those people do not
pay for sewage treatment, or pay only indirectly because the Land of
Baden-Wiirttemberghelped the municipalities with a financial program for
sewer systems. In addition, there is no fiscal equivalence since all taxpayers
in Baden-Wiirttemberg had to contribute, not just those using downstream
water. Here, one could argue that all inhabitants of Baden-Wiirttemberg
profit from the protection of the waters in Lake Constance and the Rhine
River because both watercourses are important for tourism. But there are
further inconsistencies. Lake Constance and the Rhine serve not only the
people of the riparian states as places of tourism; they also serve people
from all over the world. So, the specific function at issue (e.g., use as
potable water, as sewer, as weekend escape, or as global tourism spot)
determines where jurisdictional boundary lines should be drawn.
It is more realistic to see the geographical size of a governing unit
as being defined by a process of social constructions and power struggles
(e.g., about problem definitions), than as a market process where rational
consumers lead the way to the most efficient and objective solution."' And

110. Any definition of the nature of a problem encompasses a value laden social
construction, as the considerable literature about "framing" of issues illustrates. See, e.g.,
DEBORAH A. STONE, POLIcY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLMrICAL DECISION MAKING (1997). To

adopt one set of boundaries is to downplay another. Even among environmental
definitions there are conflicts. Watersheds may fit poorly with habitat for plants and
animals or with flood plains. Whatever boundaries are chosen, management in some area
is either fragmented among jurisdictions or fails to embody important spillover effects.
111. See Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 5, at 317.
112. See Casella & Frey, supra note 77, at 643-44 (showing that defining the dominant
function and the corresponding optimal geographic area of a public good is a matter of
social construction). They state, "the optimal club size depends on the characteristics of the
specific public good we are discussing. A good example is the identification of optimal
currency areas. If money is viewed mainly as a means of transactions, then it is a fully nonrivalrous collective good: more people using the same currency increase the benefits to the
original users. In this case, the optimal size is as large as possible. However, if money is
viewed as a source of budget finance, or as a tool for stabilization, then the optimal size of
the monetary club is given by the requirement that preferences over the use of money be
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indeed, at Lake Constance, such a power struggle occurred between two
international commissions over standards for motor boat exhausts on Lake
Constance." The Swiss Federal Agency for Navigation fought for equal
standards on all Swiss lakes, applying the functional argument that Swiss
boaters should be able to easily move their boats from one lake to
another.114 The members of the International Commission for the Protection
of Lake Constance against Water Pollution argued, also functionally, that
a common standard for the international lake is necessary to protect the
water quality. 1 5 This example of taking the long way towards a decision
(20 years) 6 makes clear how difficult it is to integrate different functional
goals or demands when there is no territorial congruence between the
constituents of these demands and no hierarchically integrated governance
structure.
Among all of the characteristics of FOCJ, the identification and
definition ofjurisdictions deviate most sharply from real world experience
in cross-boundary water management. The new institutions in cross-border
regions are not jurisdictions because they have no direct authority over the
citizens within their territorial range and no power to tax. Furthermore,
they do not have the elements of popular democracy and direct democratic
legitimacy envisioned in the FOCJ concept. Instead, most institutions are
intergovernmental, dominated by the executive branch and bureaucrats.
Examples include all international water commissions and many of the
regional committees and councils such as the Upper Rhine Conference, the
Lake Constance Conference, the Tijuana-San Diego Planning and
Coordination Committee, and the British Columbia-Washington State
Environmental Cooperation Council The members of these institutions are
indirectly legitimated by national, state or local elections. Other crossborder initiatives do not have any democratic legitimation whatsoever. The
Regio-associations in the Upper Rhine Valley, the Lake Constance Council,
the Foundation for Border Progress (San Diego), and the Cascadia Task
Force are private groupings, although they include many publicly elected
somewhat homogeneous within the club." Id. They proceed with the proposition that "if
the optimal club size depends on the specific public good, then all consumers...should be
divided ina complex system of overlapping jurisdictions." Id. at 644. What they appear not
to see is that one has to make a decision about whether one wants a larger or a smaller
currency area. Therefore, a decision about the different values of those functions must be
made. This dilemma results from the fact that many public goods are multifunctional and
are not divisible.
113. See Joachim Blatter, Lessons from Lake Constance: Ideas, Institutions and Advocacy
Coalitions,in REFLECTIONS ON WATER: NEw APPROACHEs To TRANsBOUNDARY CONFucrs
AND CooPERATION, supra note 4, at 186,186.
114. See id. at 201,207-09,214.
115. See id. at 204-05,214.
116. See Blatter, supra note 113, at 195-97,212-15.
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members. While the new cross-border institutions do not follow Frey and
Eichenberger's concept of popular democracy, they do have other elements
of democratic legitimacy. For example, there are parallel cross-border
linkages of democratically elected legislatures almost everywhere. At Lake
Constance, some members of the sub-national parliaments around the lake
meet regularly, as do the presidents of those parliaments." In the Upper
Rhine Valley, the parliamentarians meet as the Oberrheinrat.n" In Cascadia,
the state and provincial legislators were pivotal in the creation of the Pacific
Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), and the city legislators meet as the
Cascadia Metropolitan Caucus."'
In contrast to FOCJ, even those institutions with the strongest
regulatory leverage, such as the International Commission for the
Protection of Lake Constance (IGKB), have no direct authority over the
inhabitants in the lake area. The guidelines of the commission have to be
transferred into sub-national law and enforced by the authorities of the
participating riparian jurisdictions. All institutions for transboundary water
management and all institutions for regional cross-border cooperation rely
on the financial contributions of their members-none has the power to
levy taxes.
Competition fares no better than the other aspects of FOCJ in
correctly describing what has occurred. Reality differs in two respects from
the form of competition envisioned by the proponents of FOCJ: (a) the
competition between institutions is not about membership but about
problem definitions, responsibilities and funds; and (b) usually the
individuals/communities are members in several overlapping institutions
that are charged with promoting the same public good. Memberships are
not exclusive in the sense that communities or agencies have to make a
decision to belong to one or the other institution-often they belong to
both.
In reality, there is no direct opportunity for "vote" and "exit" by
citizens within existing institutions such as NADBANK and IBWC. In this
sense, the market choices that are the key to competition do not exist.
However, there is political competition, which is poorly captured by
economics-derived public choice models. As Blatter describes, competition
between different political arenas is crucial. "I°
Tensions between center and
periphery in nation states, rivalry between different layers of government,
competition between political parties and other divisions within the very
differentiated modem governmental system provide incentives for political
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119.
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See Blatter, supra note 50, at 151-52.
See, BLATrER, supra note 36, at 118.
See Alper, supra note 56, at 4-10.
See Blatter, supra note 49, at 156-60,168.
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activists to search for alliances across national borders. The result can be
greater responsiveness of the cross-border institutions towards the public.
An example is the U.S.-Mexican International Boundary and Water
Commission. After the creation of BECC and NADBANK, the IBWC
changed its character significantly. It became much more open regarding
public information and involvement and more dynamic and effective in
terms of new projects initiated." The case of Lake Constance shows that
the most intensive form of competition is based on rival interests and
functional goals related to water use. This example involved a twenty-year
battle between the IGKB (commission for water protection) and the ISKB
(commission for navigation) about regulations for boats and ships on the
lake.1u
In summary, while FOCJappear to capture some aspects of reality,
the driving factors identified are all ill chosen. The world of intermestic
politics is already characterized by strong functional orientations, various
overlaps, and political competition but not by directly democratic
jurisdictions. Instead, we find many transboundary regimes organized
around intergovernmental commissions, as well as networks and
communities focused on specific policies and grouped as advocacy
coalitions.lu It is never the individual consumer and only at times an
economic functional logic that drives institution building and change. FOCJ
fail the tests of realism and identification of causal inference.
Problem Solving Capacity
We turn now to the problem solving capacity of FOCJ. Do they
provide descriptions and solutions that make problems easier to manage?
Are they a recipe for effective governance? There are several serious flaws
that prevent FOCJ from making meaningful advances in resolving
transboundary water resources problems.
First, they lack sufficient understanding of the nature of commongood problems like water management. The public choice perspective
treats public policy issues such as governance and the production of public
goods as if they were public service industries. This perspective neglects
essential features of the problem and, therefore, produces flawed solutions.

121. In interviews, the IBWC commissioners proudly provide favorable comparisons
of their accomplishments in relation to those of BECC and NADBANK. Interview withJohn
Bernal, Commissioner, International Boundary Water Commission, in Bellagio, Italy (June
5,1997); Interview with Arturo Herrera Solis, Commissioner, International Boundary Water
Commission, in Bellagio, Italy Oune 5,1997).
122. See Blatter, supranote 113, at 195-97,212-15.
123. See generally Paul A. Sabatier & Hank C. Jenkins-Smith, The Advocacy Coalition
Framework:An Assessment, in THEORIES OFTHEPOUCYPROCESS 117 (Paul Sabatiered., 1999).
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As demonstrated, common goods such as water are
multidimensional (drinking, shipping, power generation, irrigation,
recreation, ecological functions, economic development, et al.). For this
reason, the principle of fiscal equivalence does not work very well as an
instrument to define the one best size of a geographical area for governing
water. Instead of applying economic criteria or markets to the task of
creating boundaries, a political process of trading values off against one
another must take place. It is necessary to determine the most important
function(s), create the government structure(s) corresponding to these
functions, and find some mechanisms to deal with the interdependencies
and spillovers between these functions.
The tasks associated with water management contain features that
typically result in market failure. For example, adequate water planning
requires a long time horizon. Given uncertainties of global climate change
upon water supplies, looking a century ahead is not too farsighted. The
customers of water utilities, given the choice between long-term rationality
and immediate benefits to their water rates, can be expected to look to the
short term. Because water impacts virtually all systems, including patterns
of human settlement, habitat for species, and long-term economic
productivity, multi-objective planning that takes into account the possible
negative and positive side effects of proposed water projects is necessary.
In a competitive market, water utilities that cut out such expensive analysis
and hiring of analysts will likely attract the most customers.
Furthermore, Frey and Eichenberger seriously misunderstand the
process of institution building, and the extent to which resilient and
sustainable institutions must have sufficiently general portfolios or
substantial jurisdictions to balance benefits and costs and maintain long
term support. In general, we are quite sympathetic with Frey and
Eichenberger's conceptualization of the emergence of functional
differentiation and institutionalization as an endogenous process from the
bottom up through the choices of citizens and communities (i.e., people
cause institutions to play different roles). This process is especially likely
to take place when tasks are productive in character (e.g., the building of
sewer systems and sewage treatment plants). However, voluntary
cooperation and association are far less likely to emerge when tasks are
predominantly regulatory or redistributive. 2 , With respect to
redistribution, Frey and Eichenberger acknowledge that there may be
problems. They propose reliance upon centralized government or the
establishment of a FOCUS, defined as a democratically elected
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governmental agency with taxing power specializing in interregional
redistribution.' This hardly solves such problems since a governmental
form without the ability to distribute benefits and left only with the
redistributive burden of imposing costs would not be very stable. In that
case, a FOCUS would not emerge at all because the citizens or communities
who would have to pay would have no incentive to stay. The same is true
for many regulatory tasks like the setting of standards for water quality.
There is no reason to believe that a FOCUS would emerge to bring together
downstream and upstream interests, because the latter would have no
incentive to restrict their activities. Even for productive public policies there
is a need to restrict the freedom of citizens or communities to avoid the
"free rider" problem that is acknowledged by Frey and Eichenberger.
With the exclusion of many tasks and the restricted freedom of choice in
many remaining fields, the FOCJ concept loses much of its claim to better
resolve problems.
Even more damaging for the problem solving capacity of FOCJ,
such entities are likely to make fundamental problems more serious while
appearing to efficiently solve simple tasks. Assuming that territorial
spillovers are minimized through the endogenous process Frey and
Eichenberger prescribe, optimal sizes and territorial ranges of FOCJ are
arrived at in the sense of reducing spillovers between people who benefit
and those who pay. However, what would be gained? In comparison to the
present governance institutions, we would have reduced the need for
interterritorial coordination, but the price being paid would be the
deepening of interfunctional/intersectoral divisions (e.g., between
economic and environmental goals).
Frey and Eichenberger argue that intersectoral coordination or
interfunctional bargaining would be enhanced since the political managers
of FOCJ have a stronger incentive to bargain than do the classic
bureaucrats.1 ' In their view, the direct internal accountability of FOCJ
governments and the presence of a competitive, market-like system among
FOCJ would produce better-coordinated results than a hierarchically
integrated bureaucracy." This conclusion contrasts sharply with some of
the findings of scholars in the field of interlocking politics
(Politikverflechtung),who stress that the rules of parliamentarian democracy
reduce the bargaining flexibility of executives in interjurisdictional
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interactions.' The need to run for election within a jurisdiction induces its
government agents to behave in an egoistic manner. The possibilities for
integrative solutions or compromises consequently shrink. The infusion of
even more direct democracy further restricts interjurisdictional problem
solving. Referenda, for instance, which are much more specific than the
programs of elected representatives, leave fewer possibilities for package
deals, side payments and issue linkages in interterritorial or interfunctional
negotiations. This is more true where there is less congruence among the
geographical spaces of different functional jurisdictions, because voters are
not multiple selves who can discount their various functional goals. For
example, if a member of a FOCUS that is providing potable water by long
distance pipelines is also a member of another FOCUS that specializes in
water protection in his/her home area, he/she will press the government
of the first FOCUS to provide cheap and clean water, but will rationally
advocate only modest measures for protection of the water when at home.
To summarize the capacity of FOJ to solve problems, a
government system that is structured basically along functional lines and
which operates mainly through competition leads to a situation where
intersectoral or interfunctional divisions and conflicts are predominant. It
is intersectoral coordination and integration that we are missing most in
modern times.' Before we throw away traditional mechanisms like
territorially based bureaucracies and substitute intergovernmental regimes
and networks that provide at least a certain degree of integration, we
should look carefully at the realistic alternatives.
Implications for Democracy
The last criterion for an evaluation is the democratic implication of
such a model: Does it provide an adequate definition of democracy? Does
it facilitate and enhance democratic practices? One of public choice
theorists' most serious flaws is to define democracy too narrowly as a
mechanism to provide public goods efficiently according to consumers'
preferences.
We start from a dual and complementary understanding of
democracy." First, there is government for the people (common good,
efficiency, justice, and enlightenment); this is an output-oriented
129. See Arthur Benz, Mehrcbenen-Verflechtung: Verhandlungsprozesse in verbunden
Entscheidunsgsarenen, in HORIZONTALE POLTIKVERPLECHTUNG: ZUR THEORIE VON
VERHANDLUNGSSYMMEN 147,175 (Arthur Benz et al. eds., 1992).
130. This Is why the notion of sustainable development, which integrates economic,
ecological and social goals, has gained so much attention in the 1990s.
131. See FRrz ScHARn, DVemoKRATim2mOR zwjscENe
UTOPIE UND ANPASSUNG 21

(1970).
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definition." Second, there is government by the people (authentic
representation, participation, and governmental responsiveness); this can
be called an input-oriented definition. In both dimensions, public choice

theorists apply definitions' that are too narrow in scope.
In the output-oriented dimension, the role of democracy is not
simply to solve problems effectively and efficiently in economic terms; it
is also to educate, enlighten and empower citizens. Democracy creates
public spaces or forums where citizens can engage in discourse that
develops their capacity for empathy and heightens the possibility of
agreement upon actions to promote the common good as opposed to
narrow self interest.'M FOCJ not only enhance further segregation and an
unequal distribution of wealth,' they also structurally undermine public
awareness of interfunctional interdependence and the acceptance of
integrated policy approaches.
The public choice theorists have a strongly instrumentalist view of
institutions, governance, and democracy. In their eyes, institutions are
purposely created tools to efficiently implement collective tasks according
to the preferences of the constituent individuals. In a world requiring
complex, multiple, and continual discussions, what people expect from
their government may be less the economists' notions of efficiency than the
reduction of uncertainty and the limitation of the necessity for continually

132. See id.
133. See Casella & Frey, supra note 77, at 641 (discussing public administration as a
complex of "public services industries").
134. See ANNE LARASONSCHNEIDER& HELEN INGRAM, POLIcY DESIGN FOR DEmocRAcY
5-7 (1997). See also JOHN S. DRYZEK, DEMOCRACY INCAPrrALST TIMES: IDEALS, LIMITS AND
STRUGGLES (1996); BRUCE ALAN WILIAMS &ALBERT R. METHANY, DEMOCRACY, DIALOGUE
AND ENviRONMErAL DiSpUrES (1995).
135. FOCJ would lead towards an even more unjust society. This is because the concept
relies heavily on the mechanism of "exit" to reach an effective government. See Frey &
Eichenberger, supra note 5, at 318. As Hirschman has argued, this can, but does not have
to, result in attempts by governments to improve their performance. See ALBERT O.
HmscHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE INFIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES 3-5 (1970). Exit might strip the government of the crucial memberships
necessary to reach a better performance. See id. at 4, 21-29. And that is exactly what
happens in the real world. Frey and Eichenberger's example of American special districts
is illustrative: it might be that those special districts are efficient; that does not mean they
are effective. What are more obvious are the side effects of a local government system
where "exit" is rather easy: racial and economic segregation. It is not that public choice
theorists refuse to acknowledge this phenomenon. Casella and Frey write, "[to) reach the
correct club size, segregation is optimal" and note that this might be "possibly disturbing
on political grounds...." Casella & Frey, supra note 77, at 642. It seems that it cannot really
disturb them since from their theoretical perspective, segregation is a result of different
endowments and tastes. They imply that people segregate because they like doing
so-which may certainly be true for citizens in municipalities like Beverly Hills or Bel Air.
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making choices and expressing preferences about policy choices.13' Frey
and Eichenberger acknowledge that this might be an issue when they
discuss "overburdened citizens" and "overburdened consumers," '37 i.e.,
people with too many choices and too little time. Their solution-that
citizens can rely on intermediating institutions that reduce the "burdens of
choice" '..-is not viable if the prescriptions they offer undermine such
institutions. Political parties, which they think can fulfill this function, are
characterized by the bundling of functional goals and interests because
they are integrated along ideological lines. A functionally segmented
political system would invite the fragmentation of multisectoral
institutions. They might disintegrate into single-issue groupings. Interest
groups who previously have had to broaden their appeal to get on the
agenda of governmental institutions might be encouraged to focus more
narrowly, thereby increasing divisiveness among citizens.
From the perspective of an input-oriented definition of democracy,
good governance can be reached only when the institutional setting
provides opportunities for several kinds of inputs. First, there must be
receptivity to popular opinion. This might be organized through direct
electoral procedures (which give money and the media the most power to
shape preferences and opinions), or through more representative
procedures (which allow parties to shape and bundle those inputs).
Second, in a complex modem society, good governance relies on expertise
provided by a routinized bureaucracy and by scientists in interest groups
and universities. Third, modem societies are differentiated and integrated
through specialized organizations.' These collective and corporate actors
serve as pressure groups for their specific interests in the public realm, but
also as integration mechanisms with respect to their members.14 Good
public governance relies on such intermediate actors in many respects.""
Balancing ideologies, expertise, and interests is the major challenge for
democratic and sustainable institutions of governance. Public-choice based
concepts, in contrast, have a much more narrow-minded conceptualization
of inputs for democratic governance. This conceptualization leads to
simplistic proposals like FOCJ.

136. Note that we are not advocates of a paternalistic government. We simply want to
demonstrate that there is much more ambivalence and paradox in the "brave new world
of free choice" than proponents of clear-cut solutions acknowledge.
137. See Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 5, at 324-25.
138. See id.
139. See Renate Mayntz, Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen, in
POLICY-ANALYSE: KRITIK UND NEUORiENTIERUNG 39, 42-43 (Adrienne Hdritier ed., 1993).

140. See JAMES S. COLEMAN, POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY 15 (1974).
141. See generally GERHARD LEHMBRUCH & PHILIPPE C. SCHMITTER, PATTERNS OF
CORPORATIST POLICY-MAKING (1982).
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CONCLUSION
Periods of transition are times of ambiguity, full of uncertainty and
danger but at the same time capable of producing great creativity. As the
case of transborder water management confirms, a proliferation of new,
imaginative, innovative, and more democratically responsive institutions
has come about. The present political world is witnessing the demise of the
nation state as the incontestable dominant actor in resolving crossboundary problems. Yet scholarship has lagged behind such events. Much
of the diplomatic, bureaucratic, environmental and legal literature dealing
with transboundary natural resources continues to take state-centered
models as a given. However, the alternative model with the greatest
scholarly appeal and ideological support presents its own problems. The
public-choice paradigm (oriented toward markets) challenges the
hegemony of centrist models but is itself hegemonic. The strong bias that
underlies its assumptions closes off, rather than invites, the conceptual
creativity necessary for scholarship that might advance the design of
transnational boundary institutions.
Our discussion of models of governance has taken the following
line of argument. First, we briefly introduced the basic assumptions of
state-centered models and pointed to the mismatch between these models
and evolving reality in transboundary water resources management. Our
examples of cross-border institutions dealing with transboundary water
resources in Europe and North America made very clear how far reality
has moved from a model that sees the nation state as a sovereign actor and
an impermeable barrier between the fields of domestic and international
politics. A broad diversity of cross-border linkages and institutions
involving many sub-national and non-governmental actors has emerged
during the last decades. Central governments still play major roles in both
fields, but they are neither the only powerful hierarchical actors in
domestic politics nor the sole representatives of a monolithic national
interest in international politics. The state-centered model fails not only to
capture the present realities but is unable to solve contemporary
contradictions. It is an inappropriate model for the future because it is
trapped in a trade-off between technically effective and democratically
responsive institutions.
We then turned to the most daring contemporary proposal to deal
with the emerging world of intermestic politics. Public choice scholars see
the demise of the nation state as positive and are optimistic that other
forms of governance provide better opportunities for improved resolution
of problems and democracy. They are making provocative and refreshing
contributions. Yet we are concerned that their dominant concepts, so
appealing to social scientists for their theoretical simplicity, will overwhelm
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serious appraisal of other more complex, realistic, and helpful conceptions.
Consequently, our argument tackles the markets or public choice
perspective head on.
Focusing on the "functional, overlapping and competing
jurisdictions" (FOCJ) model proposed by Frey and Eichenberger, 42 we
admit that this public choice idea captures many aspects of real institution
building processes in cross-border regions better than do state-centered
models. However, we demonstrate that it is still not a model that
adequately explains those processes. Measured against the tests of
explanatory power, problem solving capacity, and the fostering of
democracy, we find FOCJ to be lacking.
We have demonstrated that a simple model proposing a
transformation from territorially defined units with hierarchical
coordination to functional jurisdictions with market coordination will lead
neither towards a better understanding of a world of intermestic politics
nor towards effective and democratic governance. We are now left to
characterize the direction better theories should take. This direction
involves three basic insights.
First, the principal actors in transboundary water policies and in
the sphere of intermestic politics are, in general, neither unitary states nor
individual consumers, but collective and corporate actors, including
agencies from different sectors and levels of government, nongovernmental organizations, corporations, and scientific communities.
Consequently, the aggregation of interests and values is a complex web of
interactions fragmented along a number of dimensions without a central
actor or arena
for decision-making processes. Therefore, notions like
"network,"1 43 "multi-level governance" 1" (for Europe), or "multi-layered
diplomacy"' (with examples from the United States, Canada and
Australia) have to be reflected in models capturing the world of intermestic
politics. Such complex analytical models are not what advocates of clearcut deductive logic would prefer."

142. See Frey & Eichenberger, supra note 5.
143. See generallyPatrick Kenis & Volker Schneider, PolicyNetworks and Policy Analysis:
Scrutinizing a New Analytical Toolbox, in PoLIcY NETWORKS 25 (Bernd Marin & Renate
Mayntz eds., 1991).
144. Gary Marks et al., European Integrationfrom the 19809: State-centric v. Multi-level
Governance, 34 J.COMMON MKT. STUID. 341, 347 (1996).
145. See HOCKING, supra note 72, at 31-69.
146. See, for example, the statement of Williamson, who had so much influence on how
economists (and other social scientists) think about institutions and modes of governance:
"Parsimony, after all, is what science is after." OLIVERE. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF
GOVERNANCE 6 (1996).
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Second, it is important for models to incorporate the wisdom of
organizational theory and institutional analysis. Institutions are historically
and contextually contingent and cannot be easily adjusted towards
imperatives of effective production.' Instrumental views that ignore
organizational imperatives also incorrectly neglect other functions of
institutions, such as constructing identities.
Third, models of governance cannotbe built upon simplistic action
theory. Rational choice notions of human behavior must be supplemented
with concepts that are based on values and social norms. In the world of
intermestic politics, political actors face complex and dynamic
environments in which it is impossible to base choice on rational
calculations and strategies. Thus, symbols, images, and social constructions
become very important. Any model that would offer a more accurate
understanding of collective political action must be based upon
"normative-cognitive ideas" as focal points for joint action 1' or "adaptive
systems," where interaction is based on similarities between the actors,
must have a central place.149 This is shown, for example, by Blatter,1" who
explains the strict regulation of motorboats on Lake Constance by the rise
of a cross-border Euroregion. Fostered by the introduction of the Single
European Market in 1992,5' the notion of a Euroregion has stimulated
politicians on all sides of the border to look for joint tasks. The spillover of
ideas from economics into transboundary water politics explains the timing
and strictness of this regulation better than can functional necessity or
strategic actions by involved parties. It is not clear how far we can put into
effect these insights for better cross-border water management, but such
approaches are certainly necessary for a better understanding of the

147. See Ellen M. Immergut, The Normative Roots of the New Institutionalism:HistoricalInstitutionalismandComparativePolicy Studies, in BErrRAGEZURTHEORIEENTWIcKLUNG INDER
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"turbulent world" " that accompanies the process of "debordering the
world of states.""
Our final message is a call for variety instead of simplicity in
approaching the challenges of intermestic politics. In a dynamic and
complex world filled with uncertainties, an adequate governance system
for any resource must encompass a broad range of governance modes. For
example, Scharpf differentiates the notion of modes of governance into
structural and process dimensions."5 He calls the first "institutional
setting" and distinguishes between hierarchies, assemblies, associations,
joint-decision systems, networks, regimes, markets, and fields."5 The
second is labeled "modes of interaction" and comprises the following:
hierarchical direction, voting, negotiation, and unilateral action. 5 We
would add a third dimension in differentiating governance models.
Institutions can be built around different focal points including territory
(cities, states, or nations), scientific expertise (regulatory regimes),
consumer choices (organizations for special services), cultural identities
(communities), and others.
In the future, transboundary water politics will be increasingly
influenced by the flows of information across territorial boundaries and by
direct interdependencies of global and local forces. Which considerations
should dominate institutional designs depends very much upon context.
We would expect particular kinds of institutions to work well in some
contexts and not others; therefore, models must be tailored to match
circumstances. The emerging world order is likely to be characterized by
an enormous variety of institutional forms. What may be lacking is not
sufficient competition between functionally or sectorally differentiated
institutions, as the public choice theorists would lead us to believe, but,
conversely, institutions that foster cooperation and bridge various divisions
through communication. We need to construct institutions that unite
people and enhance their sense of a common stake in issues as important
as water.
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